Ed Langley f152d105e6 Merge pull request #87 from fiddlerwoaroof/wave/harness-generator-gp
Wave G: the generator's real cost, the artefact families, and two harness gaps
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improvise

Terminal pivot-table modeling in the spirit of Lotus Improv — multidimensional cells, formulas over dimensions instead of cell addresses, and vim-style keybindings for reassigning axes on the fly.

demo

Why this exists

Lotus Improv (NeXT, 1991) separated data from its presentation: cells were addressed by named dimensions, not grid coordinates, and rearranging a view didn't break formulas. That idea never made it into mainstream tools. Excel pivot tables borrowed the visual rearrangement but kept cell-address formulas. Terminal data tools like sc-im and VisiData do different things well — sc-im is a traditional spreadsheet, VisiData is a data explorer — but neither offers the dimension-keyed data model that made Improv interesting. improvise is a small attempt to bring that model to a modern terminal, with a formula language that references category and item names, views that can be rearranged with a single keystroke, and a plain-text file format you can diff in git.

See docs/design-notes.md for the original product vision and non-goals.

Quick start

nix build .
./result/bin/improvise examples/demo.improv

Or import your own CSV:

./result/bin/improvise import path/to/data.csv

The included examples/demo.improv was generated from examples/demo.csv:

improvise import examples/demo.csv \
  --no-wizard \
  --category Region --category Product --category Customer \
  --measure Revenue --measure Cost \
  --time Date --extract Date:Month \
  --axis Region:row --axis Product:row \
  --axis Date_Month:column --axis Measure:column \
  --axis Customer:page --axis Date:none \
  --formula "Profit = Revenue - Cost" \
  --name "Acme Sales Demo" \
  -o examples/demo.improv

Key bindings to try first

Key Action
T Enter tile mode — reassign category axes
[ / ] Cycle through page-axis items
> Drill into an aggregated cell
< Return from drill-down
F Open the formula panel
t Transpose rows and columns
? / F1 Full key reference
:w Save
:q Quit

Installation

With Nix (preferred)

nix build .
# or install into your profile:
nix profile install .

From crates.io

Not yet published — improvise is not on crates.io, so cargo install improvise does not work today. It is tracked as improvise-l36.

Prebuilt binaries

The GitHub releases page carries prebuilt binaries for Linux (x86_64 and aarch64) and macOS (Intel and Apple Silicon), built by cargo dist. The current release is the v0.1.0-rc2 prerelease; there is no v0.1.0 tag yet (improvise-3tj).

The data model

Every cell lives at the intersection of named categories and items — (Region=East, Measure=Revenue) — not at a grid address like B3. A model can have up to 12 categories, each with an ordered list of items that can be organized into collapsible groups (e.g. months grouped into quarters).

Formulas reference dimension names, not cell addresses:

Profit = Revenue - Cost
Tax = Revenue * 0.08
Margin = IF(Revenue > 0, Profit / Revenue, 0)
BigDeal = Sum(Revenue WHERE Region = "West")

The formula language supports + - * / ^, comparisons, IF, and aggregation functions (Sum, Avg, Min, Max, Count) with optional WHERE clauses. Formulas apply uniformly across all intersections — no copying, no dragging, no $A$1 anchoring.

Views and axes

A view assigns each category to one of four axes: row, column, page (slicer), or hidden. The grid layout is a pure function of (Model, View) → GridLayout — transposing is just swapping row and column assignments, and it happens in one keystroke (t). Page-axis categories act as filters: [ and ] cycle through items.

Press T to enter tile mode, where each category appears as a tile in the tile bar. Move between tiles with h/l, then press Space to cycle axes or r/c/p to set one directly.

Records mode (R) flips to a long-format view by assigning the virtual _Index and _Dim categories to row and column axes. Drill-down (>) on an aggregated cell captures a snapshot; edits accumulate in a staging area and commit atomically on exit.

File format

Models persist to a plain-text .improv format that reads like markdown and diffs cleanly in git:

# Sales 2025

## Category: Region
- North
- South
- East [Coastal]
- West [Coastal]
> Coastal

## Category: Measure
- Revenue
- Cost
- Profit

## Formulas
- Profit = Revenue - Cost [Measure]

## Data
Region=East, Measure=Revenue = 1200
Region=East, Measure=Cost = 800

## View: Default (active)
Region: row
Measure: column
format: ,.2f

Gzip-compressed .improv.gz is also supported. Legacy JSON is auto-detected for backward compatibility.

Import and scripting

The import wizard analyzes CSV columns and proposes each as a category (string-valued), measure (numeric), time dimension (date-like, with optional year/month/quarter extraction), or skip. Multiple CSVs merge automatically with a synthetic "File" category.

All model mutations go through a typed command registry, so the same operations that back the TUI work headless:

# single commands
improvise cmd 'add-cat Region' 'add-item Region East' -f model.improv

# script file (one command per line, # comments)
improvise script setup.txt -f model.improv

In the browser

The browser page is at https://fiddlerwoaroof.github.io/improvise/app/, built and published from main by the build / pages-deploy jobs in .github/workflows/ci.yml. A deploy only happens after every check job in that workflow has passed. The list is deliberately not repeated here — naming a subset is how this sentence went stale before, and scripts/check-ci-graph.py now holds pages-deploy's needs to the workflow's own job keys.

The site root is the landing page — docs/index.html, with the recorded terminal casts — and it links to the app. web/assemble.sh puts the two together, which is why the app sits under app/ rather than at the root: every path in app.js and worker.js is relative, so the bundles move with it and the generated wasm-pack glue needs no editing.

It needs no server. The page is still a thin client — it holds no model, and every question about a cell, its text and whether it may be typed into, is answered by a server and arrives already decided — but the server it talks to is an in-page Web Worker hosting the whole App over the browser's private storage (OPFS). It is seeded on first load from web/demo.improv, so a visitor lands on a document, and edits persist across a reload without leaving the machine. ?doc= and ?seed= name another document and the file it is first seeded from.

To run the same page locally:

./web/build.sh                              # wasm-pack -> web/{pkg,worker-pkg}
python3 -m http.server 8080 --directory web

The page and the OPFS backend are exercised by a Playwright harness in harness/ — npm ci and ./harness/build.sh, then npx playwright test from that directory. tests/shell.spec.js runs web/app.js under Chromium against a mocked peer; tests/opfs.spec.js runs the Storage contract against a real OpfsFs in a real Web Worker under Chromium and Firefox (WebKit provides no OPFS and is skipped on a runtime probe). CI's browser job runs both and can fail the build.

To open a document hosted by a separate process instead — which is how a document open in the TUI is shared — start the websocket server and pass ?ws=:

cargo run -p improvise-ws-server -- examples/demo.improv --port 8787

then reload with ?ws=127.0.0.1:8787.

The scheme is not yours to supply and defaults to TLS. ?ws= takes a host:port; the page uses wss:// when it is itself served over https and ws:// when it is served over http, because an https origin refuses a ws:// address as mixed content. An explicit ws:// from an https page is upgraded rather than passed through — passing it through can only produce a failure that reads like "the server is not running".

So the local pairing above works as written, and it is the case worth optimising for: http://localhost is not a secure-context problem, so nothing below is needed to develop, to demo locally, or to share a TUI-hosted document with another tab on the same machine.

The server checks Origin on the handshake, which is what makes that safe. A WebSocket is exempt from the same-origin policy — there is no CORS preflight — so without the check any page you visited could connect to ws://127.0.0.1:8787 and read or edit the document while the server runs. Pages served from loopback are allowed by default, which is exactly the recipe above; every other page is refused unless you name it with --allow-origin. A client that sends no Origin at all — curl, a script, a native client — is allowed, because no browser omits it and refusing them would answer a question --bind already answers.

This is not authentication (see the next section) and it does not depend on the browser: whatever Chromium's Local Network Access work ends up covering, the handshake is refused here rather than at the browser's discretion.

Sharing a TUI-hosted document with a remote browser

Reaching improvise-ws-server from the deployed https page means terminating TLS in front of it. improvise-ws-server speaks plain ws:// only — there is no rustls, no native-tls, nothing in the crate or its dependencies — so wss:// is not obtainable from the binary itself, and this is the supported way to get it.

Say the cost first, because it is real. This means the documented path to sharing involves a second piece of software, which is a poor answer for a tool whose selling point is that it is one binary. It is the answer anyway, for a reason given under "Why not native wss://" below. If you only want a document in a browser, you do not need any of this — that is the standalone worker deployment, it is what the Pages site is for, and it needs no server process at all.

Read this before following any of it. improvise-ws-server has no authentication of any kind, and that is a deliberate MVP limit rather than an oversight — its own module doc says so. Anyone who can open a socket to it can rewrite every document it serves. Loopback binding is the only thing currently standing between that and the network, and terminating TLS in front of it removes exactly that protection: the proxy is public, so the endpoint is public, and --bind 127.0.0.1 protects the port while doing nothing about the proxy. TLS gets you confidentiality, not access control.

And the control has to be one a browser can actually satisfy, which rules out most of the obvious ones. The page opens the socket as new WebSocket(url) — one argument, a URL — and the distinction that decides everything here is ambient credentials versus challenge–response:

  • The handshake is an HTTP request, so the browser attaches what it attaches automatically — cookies for that host above all. That is why an identity-aware proxy can work at all.
  • What the page cannot do is set a header (there is no Authorization argument to new WebSocket) or answer a prompt (a handshake surfaces no login dialog, and its failure reaches script as a bare connection error).

So HTTP basic auth is not a locked door here, it is a 401 the page can neither answer nor explain — the same shape as the self-signed certificate that rules out native wss:// below. Anything challenge-shaped fails for that reason; anything ambient may work. Client-certificate mTLS sits awkwardly between the two — the certificate is offered at the TLS layer rather than by the page, but the selection UI browsers show is a top-level-navigation affordance, and whether a cross-origin socket handshake gets it is not something verified here.

And "who may connect" is two questions, not one. A WebSocket is exempt from the same-origin policy — there is no CORS preflight on a handshake — so any hostile page an allowed user visits can open a socket to your endpoint from that user's own allowed address, and read and write the document. An address check cannot see that, because by then the request genuinely does come from an allowed client. Only the Origin header distinguishes them, and improvise-ws-server checks it: pages served from loopback are allowed, and anything else must be named with --allow-origin. Deploying behind a proxy therefore needs the flag — the deployed page's origin is https://fiddlerwoaroof.github.io, which is not loopback. Keep the Origin allow-list in the proxy as well: it is defence in depth now rather than the only defence, and it is what covers a proxy configuration that strips or rewrites the header before the server can see it.

So the honest controls are the ones that need no credential from the page:

  • An IP allow-list in the proxy — the cheapest, and the worked example below. It is about where the client is, so the page sends nothing. On its own it answers only the first of the two questions above.
  • A private network (Tailscale, WireGuard). The peer is only reachable by machines already on it; again the page sends nothing.
  • An identity-aware tunnel (cloudflared with Cloudflare Access) — the ambient case above, and the reason that distinction is drawn at all. It works by a session cookie set after an interactive login on the proxy's own hostname, which the handshake then carries by itself; so it needs the user to visit that hostname first, and it is subject to the browser's third-party-cookie rules. Plausible and not verified here — the Playwright harness mocks its peer and reaches no identity-aware proxy — so it is named, not written out as a recipe.

What would make this genuinely easy is a token in the URL, because the URL is the one place the page can put a credential deliberately — everything else it sends is ambient. The server has no such capability today, and whether it should grow one — or whether "auth is the proxy's job" becomes a stated design position — is improvise-kpnr.

Until then: share only documents you would be willing to let anyone on the other side of that control edit, and take the tunnel down when you are done.

A worked example with Caddy, which obtains and renews the certificate itself. Point a DNS name at the host, then:

# Caddyfile
improvise.example.com {
    # NOT optional — see above. Without it the document is world-writable.
    # An allow-list rather than a password, because the page cannot answer a
    # challenge on a socket handshake: this is checked against the address.
    @denied not remote_ip 203.0.113.4 198.51.100.0/24
    abort @denied

    # Defence in depth, and NOT redundant with the address check. A WebSocket
    # is exempt from the same-origin policy, so any hostile page an allowed
    # user visits can open this socket FROM THAT ALLOWED ADDRESS. The address
    # check cannot see that; only the Origin can. The server checks it too —
    # this is what covers a proxy that strips or rewrites the header.
    @badorigin not header Origin https://fiddlerwoaroof.github.io
    abort @badorigin

    reverse_proxy 127.0.0.1:8787
}
# --allow-origin is required here: the deployed page is not a loopback origin,
# so without it the server refuses the handshake the proxy forwards.
improvise-ws-server bank-info.improv --port 8787 \
    --allow-origin https://fiddlerwoaroof.github.io   # still plain ws, still loopback
caddy run                                             # terminates TLS, proxies to it

On the same terms as the browser caveat below: this configuration has not been executed in this repository — there is no Caddy here, and the browser harness that does exist never puts a proxy in front of the socket. It is the form Caddy documents for remote_ip, and the reasoning about what a browser can satisfy is checked against web/app.js, which opens new WebSocket(url) and can therefore send no header. Verify the deny actually denies before trusting it with a document.

Then, from https://fiddlerwoaroof.github.io/improvise/app/, reload with ?ws=improvise.example.com. Caddy preserves the request path, so the multi-document form works too: serve several files and name one with ?ws=improvise.example.com/bank-info.

Caddy needs no websocket-specific configuration — reverse_proxy passes the Upgrade handshake through. nginx does: it needs proxy_http_version 1.1 and the Upgrade/Connection headers set explicitly, or the handshake is answered as an ordinary request and the socket never opens.

For a one-off share with no DNS name and no certificate of your own, cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:8787 or ngrok http 8787 each print an https hostname that works the same way — pass the hostname to ?ws= without a scheme, and pass the page's own origin to --allow-origin, since it is not loopback. Both print a public URL and neither authenticates anything by default, and an unguessable URL is not a control.

Two things carry over from above. ngrok http --basic-auth does not help here — the page cannot answer a basic-auth challenge on a socket handshake — and what you want instead is the same address check the Caddy example uses. But no command line for it is given here on purpose: ngrok has moved IP restriction from the (now deprecated) --cidr-allow flag to a Traffic Policy restrict-ips action passed with --traffic-policy-file, and cloudflared's equivalent is a product feature of its own. Those spellings have already changed once, none of them has been run in this repository, and a recipe that is correct today and silently wrong at the next major version is worse than a pointer — so: consult their current documentation, and confirm the restriction denies before you trust it with a document. If you cannot put an address check in front of the tunnel, do not expose it.

Note the server binds 127.0.0.1 by default and --bind is the only way to widen that. Behind a proxy on the same host you should not widen it: the proxy reaches loopback, and leaving the default keeps the unencrypted port off the network. That is worth doing and is not access control — the proxy is still the open door, which is why the access controls above belong there. Those are access controls and not authentication, which the server still has none of: they answer which clients and which origins may connect, never who is connecting. The distinction is the whole of improvise-kpnr.

Why not native wss://

Declined deliberately rather than merely unimplemented (improvise-o8fa). Adding rustls is the easy half; the certificate is the hard one, and it is what makes the feature worse than the proxy rather than better. A self-signed certificate makes the browser refuse the socket outright — a websocket handshake has no interstitial to click through, so the failure arrives as a bare connection error with no usable indication that a certificate was the reason. That leaves a real certificate or an explicitly trusted local CA (mkcert) as the only pleasant options, and both of those are a second piece of software too. So the choice is not "one binary versus two", it is "two either way, and one of the options additionally ships a TLS stack and a certificate-loading surface in a binary whose job is a pivot table". If sharing a TUI-hosted document to a remote browser ever becomes a common case rather than an occasional one, this is worth revisiting on that evidence.

Caveat, narrowed twice: harness/ runs web/app.js under Chromium — the standalone deployment under Firefox too — and OpfsFs under Chromium and Firefox, in CI. The grouped and multi-level DOM is executed since improvise-plcx, against a fixture document the harness serves beside the demo. What is still never executed is the CSS and the ResizeObserver arithmetic — and Safari, whose Playwright build provides no OPFS at all. bindings.rs is run: the no-?ws test loads the app, which spawns the worker, which calls start() and OpfsFs::open().

What's interesting about the architecture

All user actions flow through a two-phase command/effect pipeline. Commands are pure functions: they receive an immutable CmdContext (model, layout, cursor position, mode) and return a list of effects. Effects are the only things that mutate app state, and each one is a small, debuggable struct. This means commands are testable without a terminal, effects can be logged or replayed, and the 40+ commands and 50+ effect types are all polymorphic — dispatched through trait objects and a registry, not a central match block. The keybinding system gives each of the 17 modes (ModeKey) its own keymap, with Emacs-style prefix keys for multi-stroke sequences.

Expectations

improvise is a personal project I built for my own use. I'm sharing it because other people might find it useful, but I can't promise active maintenance or feature development. Issues and PRs are welcome but may not get a fast response. If you want to build on it, fork away.

License

Apache-2.0

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